Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

Executive Registry
73-3329

P-1

18 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Breakfast with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger on 15 June 73

ATTENDING: Dr. Kissinger, BG Brent Scowcroft, and Mr. Colby

1. We opened with mutual pleasure at renewing this association which began in the mid-'60s over Vietnam. We agreed that the overthrow of Diem was a great mistake. (I described the Mendenhall/Krulak visit to the "same country" in 1963.) Dr. Kissinger said the overthrow of a friendly government was a very wrong thing. I concurred and added that doing so without a clear idea of the follow-on alternative was certainly less than wise. I discussed the need for a Pacification Program in the early '60s and our inability to organize in the USG to have one, as a result of which the military option was pursued. We discussed the Watergate slightly, Dr. K. commenting that he didn't understand why Mr. Helms hadn't consulted him on the approaches made to Helms. I said that Mr. Helms had essentially turned these down and was particularly anxious to keep the Agency out of any form of involvement. Dr. K. commented that this managed to keep him out of involvement as if Mr. Helms had come to him he might have had to move on the subject. He expressed his high regard for Mr. Helms including the comment that Helms would probably still be in the office of DCI if it had been up to him. (Saying this without any reflection upon the incumbents.) We did agree to reaffirm the Kissinger-Helms understanding that all White House requests for CIA support or assistance should be funneled through Dr. Kissinger or at least subject to appeal to him. Dr. Kissinger hoped that the Watergate problems had not shaken CIA so that it might become subject to the same kinds of leaks that occur in other agencies. I said that I did not think the Watergate had done this in view of the way CIA had conducted itself but that there was some concern at the lower levels about the personnel reductions. I said I viewed this as one of my principal duties, to re-establish the cohesion of the Agency after this turbulence over personnel but at the same time to indicate clearly that periodic cuts would be made of the less qualified people and that a serious problem faces us of financial capability to maintain

25X1

R-1 (2)

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

staffs at any level. I described my concept that savings might be possible in the big mechanical systems through stretch-out if and only if the normal collection and analysis can provide assured strategic warning of problems ahead so that the big systems could be reactivated in time.

2. Dr. Kissinger expressed his particular desire for intelligence support in the following areas:

a. That our analysis clearly bring out alternative interpretations and possible developments and that he not be subjected to any consensus language. I said that it was in my intention to update the NIE process with this in mind, as I know Dr. Schlesinger had. I also said that I was trying to develop identified experts in major areas or functions to draw together the best expertise in intelligence on these subjects. I was conscious however of the need for the intelligence to be presented in a fashion which clearly brings out its strengths and weaknesses to him.

b. He stressed the need for warning, commenting that this is less a military problem than a political problem. He said he would probably not be able to ask me all the questions as he would be involved in many other things. I concurred and said I thought it my responsibility to anticipate his needs and to look ahead to problems on the horizon and call his attention to them at an early stage. I referred to this as political strategic warning.

c. Dr. Kissinger expressed particular concern over Sino/Soviet developments and relationships. He said that it is very important to him to have a constant assessment on these relationships and the directions in which they are moving.

3. Dr. Kissinger also commented on the 40 Committee. He said he had the impression that we were perhaps doing many things of marginal importance, perhaps to satisfy Ambassadors and others,

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

rather than concentrating on a few operations of major significance. He said he had no problem of approving those if they were wanted but he questioned their utility. I concurred with him to some degree saying that in some respects the mechanism continues to conduct operations despite a lack of substantive need. [redacted] 25X1

Dr. Kissinger concurred and suggested that it be reduced. I described our concept of "covert influence" through a few key contacts in indigenous circles who can exert influence on major developments without showing the American hand. I said that we are moving in this general direction with our covert activities and that I would look carefully over the utility of some of the on-going efforts.

4. In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, I described the problems in our relationships with the FBI in the winter of 1969-70. I then described a bit of the background of the IEC and Mr. Hoover's position. Dr. Kissinger asked whether there was any truth to the fact that the White House was dissatisfied with a "youth report" that CIA had produced and therefore had ordered the assignment abroad of a number of FBI officers. He said he had not been consulted and that he had merely been informed that such officers were to be sent. He thought it stemmed from a personal relationship between Mr. Hoover and the President rather than any dissatisfaction with CIA, which is not indicated in his files. I said I believed this was quite appropriate as I did not think there was any direct relationship with CIA's performance on the youth paper, which I described as a roundup of youth problems abroad with an introduction which included some discussion of youth dynamics in America. Rather I said that I thought that the purpose was to strengthen the FBI for its efforts on internal subversion in the 1970 atmosphere. I said that we have no substantial problem with the FBI representatives abroad who focus on criminal and domestic subversion problems. Dr. Kissinger said he would continue to look only to the DCI, although he would get Mr. Kelley of the FBI in some day and indicate clearly

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6

his primary reliance on the CIA. This was accompanied by a certain number of critical references to the fact that he had never read a foreign intelligence report submitted by the FBI so he didn't understand what their officers were doing abroad. I tried to reassure him on this point. Dr. Kissinger also indicated that

25X1

25X1 I concurred and said that I hoped we could exploit the enormous operational potential in this country along the same lines but that obviously we are limited by the fallout from the Watergate problems. I said however this is a matter of great interest to me in view of the very substantial potential offered. Dr. Kissinger seemed quite sympathetic.

W. E. Colby

WEC:gls
Distribution
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DDI
1 - DDO
1 - DDM&S
1 - DDS&T
1 - D/ONE
1 - IG
1 - OLC
1 - OGC
1 - ER
1 - Signer

Approved For Release 2005/03/07 : CIA-RDP80M01048A000800050023-6